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Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1326,  
185 L. Ed. 2d 447 (2013). 
 
David A. Bell 
 
I.  ABSTRACT 
 
 In Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center1 (“Decker”), the United States 
Supreme Court considered whether the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) and its implementing 
regulations require states and industry to obtain permits for stormwater runoff from ditches and 
culverts built as part of logging roads.  The Court determined that the Rule exempts discharges 
of “channeled stormwater” from logging roads under the CWA. 
II.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 Northwest Environmental Defense Center (NEDC) brought an action against Oregon 
timber officials and timber companies alleging that they violated the CWA by discharging 
polluted stormwater from logging road ditches into two Oregon rivers without obtaining National 
Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits.2  The NEDC invoked the CWA’s 
citizen suit provision, 33 U.S.C. § 1365, naming as defendants logging companies as well as 
state and local governments.3  The suit alleged that defendants (here, petitioners) caused 
discharges of sediment-laden stormwater runoff into the South Fork Trask River and the Little 
South Fork Kilchis River in the Oregon State Forest.4  NEDC alleged that defendants failed to 
obtain the required NPDES permits for these discharges in violation of the CWA.5  Defendants, 
with the United States as amicus curiae, argued that the EPA’s interpretation of its regulations 
and NPDES requirements (which exempted the discharges) was permissible under the CWA.6  
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III.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 Congress passed the Clean Water Act in 1972 to maintain the integrity of the “Nation’s 
waters.”7  The CWA requires individuals, corporations, and governments to secure NPDES 
permits prior to “discharging pollution from any point source into the navigable waters of the 
United States.”8   
 At issue in the case is the whether the natural runoff from rain, or “stormwater,” that 
collects and drains from logging roads is an industrial stormwater discharge requiring an NPDES 
permit.9  When the CWA was passed, it required the EPA to regulate water discharges that 
involve “industrial activity.”10  Thus, the EPA wrote the “Industrial Stormwater Rule”.11  In the 
rule, the EPA created a list of industries whose stormwater discharges would be regulated under 
the title “Standard Industrial Classification 24.”12  The dispute in Decker centers around two 
issues: 1) whether logging is an industrial activity, and 2) whether logging was included as part 
of the “Standard Industrial Classifications 24” under EPA’s industrial stormwater rule.13 
 In September 2006, NEDC filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of 
Oregon.  NEDC brought suit under the citizen provision of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), 
which provides that “any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf … against any 
person” alleged to be in violation of the CWA.  The lawsuit named as defendants the Oregon 
State Forester, the Oregon Board of Forestry, and several logging companies that used the roads 
including Stimson Lumber Company and Georgia Pacific.14  The complaint alleged that 
defendants discharged channeled stormwater without proper NPDES discharge permits, in 
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violation of the CWA.15 
 The Oregon District Court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim, finding that the 
alleged discharges were not industrial pollution and therefore did not require NPDES permits.16  
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed this decision, finding that the discharges 
were from an industrial activity and not exempt from the NPDES permitting system and 
defendants were in violation of the CWA.17   
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The Court has Proper Jurisdiction  
 
 The Court found that respondents NEDC properly established jurisdiction for this suit 
under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) of the CWA which “authorizes private enforcement of the provisions 
of the [the Clean Water Act]” and its implementing regulations.18  Before the Court, petitioners 
argued that the suit was barred by 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b), a separate provision of the CWA that 
provides for judicial review of implementing regulations.  That review is limited to challenging 
implementing regulations within 120 days of the Administrator’s action.19  The Court found that 
the Court of Appeals was correct in finding that this exclusive jurisdiction was not applicable, 
agreeing that “citizen suit” standing was proper against an alleged discharger by a citizen who 
sought to enforce the CWA.20  Specifically, the Court noted that the action was within the scope 
of § 1365 of the CWA because NEDC’s suit did not challenge the Silvicultural Rule, but sought 
to enforce a permissible reading of that rule.21   
B. The EPA’s Proposal of a New Rule Does Not Make the Issue Moot. 
 
 Just prior to oral arguments, the EPA proposed a new regulation to amend and clarify the 
                                                          
15
 Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1333. 
16
 Id. 
17
 Northwest, 640 F.3d at 1085.  
18
 Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1333.  
19
 Id. 
20
 Id. 
21
 Id. 
 4
Industrial Stormwater Rule.22  Petitioners, joined by the United States as amicus curiae, argued 
that this amendment made this case moot because it removed the controversy regarding the 
language in the Rule.23  The Court disagreed finding that “a case becomes moot only when it is 
impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.”24  Finding 
that the CWA contains retroactive remedies for NEDC’s allegations, the Court determined that 
“under these circumstances, the cases remain live and justiciable” because the possibility of 
some remedy is real.25 
C. Whether Logging Constitutes Industrial Activity. 
  Because NEDC had properly established jurisdiction and their claim was still alive, the 
Court reviewed the merits of the arguments.  Specifically, the Court determined that “under the 
[CWA], petitioners were required to secure NPDES permits for discharges of channeled 
stormwater only if they were “associated with industrial activity,” 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(2)(B).”26   
 NEDC argued that the CWA term “associated with industrial activity” “unambiguously 
covers discharges of channeled stormwater runoff from logging roads.”27  The Court dismissed 
this argument noting that the terms “industrial” and “industry” are related to business activity or 
more specifically, the processing of raw materials or manufacture of goods “in factories.”28  The 
Court gave closer consideration to NEDC’s second argument that the “the Industrial Stormwater 
Rule unambiguously required a permit for the discharges.”29  There, the Court noted NEDC’s 
point that NPDES permits are required for the categories of industries that discharge stormwater 
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from access roads in the transport of raw materials.30  But “this raises the question of whether 
logging is a categor[y] of industr[y]” that is identified in the Code of Federal Regulations 
[specifically, the industrial stormwater rule.]31  NEDC alleged that “logging” is in the regulation 
list at “Standard Industrial Classification 24.”32  Therefore, they argued, NPDES permits are 
required for the stormwater discharges related to industrial use of these roads.   
 EPA countered this argument concluding that the regulation and Standard Industrial 
Classification 24 were intended to “regulate traditional industrial sources such as sawmills” and 
other fixed facilities.33  
 While the Court entertained NEDC’s argument, it ultimately found that “[t]he 
regulation’s reach may be limited by the requirement that the discharges be directly related to 
manufacturing, processing, or materials storage areas at an industrial plant.”34  Further, the Court 
took one step further by noting that “[w]hen an agency interprets its own regulation, the Court, as 
a general rule, defers to it “unless that interpretation is ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.’”35  According Auer deference, the Court found that “[t]he EPA’s interpretation is a 
permissible one”.36  The Court determined that the agency had been consistent in its rule that 
logging activities were not industrial and did not require NPDES permits--and that the definition 
was not a “post hoc justification adopted in response to litigation.”37  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
  The Court found that the EPA permissibly construed the Industrial Stormwater Rule 
finding that the Rule exempts discharges of “channeled stormwater” from logging roads from the 
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NPDES permit process.38  This determination is a significant victory for the states and industry as 
the fines and regulations on logging roads that may have resulted would have carried enormous 
costs.  
 On a final note, there is a point of interest regarding Auer39 deference to federal agency 
rulemaking.  The Decker concurrence and dissent gave a clear indication from three members40 
of the Court that it may be time to dispense with deference to agency rulemaking.  In the words 
of Justice Scalia, (quoting Justice Thomas) “[e]nough is enough” with Auer deference.41  
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